Xerox: Wikipédia [patched]
Haloid spent years refining Carlson’s invention. The key challenge was finding a better light-sensitive material; the solution was , which could hold an electrostatic charge and dissipate it when exposed to light. To brand this new process, Haloid coined the term "xerography" – from the Greek words xeros (dry) and graphein (writing). In 1949, they launched the first crude xerographic copier, Model A , but it was manual and messy.
Then came the crisis. By late 2000, Xerox was hemorrhaging money. Its business model of leasing copiers (long-term revenue) required huge upfront capital. When sales slowed, it ran out of cash. Debt was downgraded to "junk" status. The stock price plummeted from $60 to under $4. There were serious doubts Xerox would survive. xerox wikipédia
Xerox executives from the East Coast, whose entire business model was selling large, centralized copiers, could not comprehend the value of small, networked, personal devices. When Steve Jobs of Apple visited PARC in 1979 in exchange for allowing Xerox to invest $1 million in Apple (a deal that would net Xerox over $100 million), he saw the future. He famously remarked, "Why aren’t you doing anything with this? This is the greatest thing." Xerox let the GUI and mouse slip away. Apple released the Lisa (1983) and Macintosh (1984). Microsoft later copied the concept for Windows. Xerox’s own attempt to commercialize the Alto, the Xerox Star (8010) in 1981, was technologically brilliant but priced at $16,000+ per workstation, a commercial failure. Haloid spent years refining Carlson’s invention
Xerox had invented the digital future and then failed to own it. It is the ultimate case study in – a market leader so wedded to its existing customers and profit model that it cannot see (or act on) the disruptive technology it has created. III. Decline, Restructuring, and the Japanese Onslaught (1980s–1990s) While Xerox played in the high-end, slow-to-market workstation space, its core copier business was attacked from below. Japanese companies, led by Canon , exploited a loophole. Xerox’s patents expired in the late 1970s. Canon introduced a radically different business model: the personal or desktop copier (e.g., Canon NP-200). Instead of leasing large, complex machines that required service technicians, Canon sold small, cheap, reliable copiers using a replaceable cartridge system (the "all-in-one" toner, drum, and developer unit). This shifted maintenance from a trained technician to the user. In 1949, they launched the first crude xerographic
Yet the strategic damage was permanent. Xerox had been forced to retreat from the low-end market. It remained a strong player in high-volume "production" printing and services, but it was no longer the invincible giant. The 1990s saw a series of CEOs try to redefine Xerox for the digital age. Paul Allaire (CEO 1990-1999) pushed the company into document management software and services, renaming the company The Document Company (tagline: "The Document Company – Xerox"). But the transition was painful. The core copier business was mature, and new digital initiatives were slow to profit.
The company’s destiny changed in 1938 when a patent attorney and part-time inventor, , invented electrophotography . Frustrated with the laborious process of carbon copying, Carlson created a dry, electrostatic method for reproducing images. He famously used a zinc plate covered with sulfur, a handkerchief, heat, and a static charge to create the first "copy" (the word "10-22-38 Astoria" was written on a glass slide). After being rejected by over 20 companies (including IBM and GE), Haloid took a chance on the fledgling technology.